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The Precautionary Principle in Australia:
Policy, Law & Potential Precautionary EIAs*
Warwick GuUett**
Introduction
The precautionary principle has been adopted in such a widespread
fashion that it is now difficult to find in either the international
environmental arena or countries with advanced environmental
protection frameworks an environmental policy document, a new
environmental law, or even a political statement about environmental
management that does not include a reference to the principle or reflect
some of the core ideas of the precautionary concept. References to the
principle can be found in documents produced by organizations such as
the European Environment Agency, 1 the World Trade
Organization, 2 and of course the United Nations; 3 in numerous
environmental treaties ranging from the management of straddling fish
stocks 4 to the prevention of pollution in the North Sea; 5 in
*
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1 See EEA Scientific Committee meeting and report, Practical Applications of the
Precautionary Principle, Copenhagen, May 20, 1999.
2 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(1998), Article 5(7).
3 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), Principle 15.
4 See, e.g., the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United States Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982 Relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks. The precautionary aspects of the Agreement are discussed in detail in
David Freestone & Zen Makuch, The New InternationalEnvironmental Law of

Fisheries: The 1995 United Nations Straddling Stocks Agreement, 7 Y.B. of Int'l
Envd. L. 3 (1996).

5

See London Declaration of the Second International Conference on the

Protection of the North Sea (1987). For discussion of the inclusion of the
precautionary concept in environmental treaties, see Jay E. Hickey, Jr. & Ven R.
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domestic and provincial environmental legislation; 6 as well as in a
plethora of domestic environmental policies and strategies. 7 That the
precautionary principle/approach is commonplace internationally (and,
in fact, is considered by many to have crystallized into a norm of
customary international law) and in domestic jurisdictions, is a
testament to the soundness of the concept and the usefulness of
considering precaution when devising environmental management and
protection strategies.
At its broadest level, the precautionary principle can be understood
as a crystallization of numerous concerns about the nature of modern
development, ranging from concern about the cumulative, long-term
and distant effects of activities to the lowly status often accorded to
environmental and health issues in public administration. Critics of the
principle have expressed the view that the reason it is popular is because
it has "rhetorical appeal." 8 Some advocates also see the concept as
being politically attractive, so long as it continues to be "tantalisingly
ill-defined and imperfectly translatable into codes of conduct, whilst
capturing the emotions of misgiving and guilt." 9 While there is no
Walker, Refinini the PrecautionaryPrinciple in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 14
V. Envtl. L. J. 423 (1995) and Warwick Gullett, Environmental Protection and the
'PrecautionaryPrinciple'. A Response to Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental
Management, 14 Envtl. & Planning L. J. 52 (1997).
6 In Canada, see e.g., Environment Act, R.S.N.S., § 2(a)(ii) (1994-95) (Nova
Scotia), Sustainable Development and Consequential Amendments Act, R.S.M., §
3(l), Sched. A4 (1998) (Manitoba), and the proposed amended preamble to the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1997 that is, at the time of writing,
before the House of Commons (2nd Session, 35th Parliament, 45 Elizabeth II, 199697, Bill C-74). The most recent innovative inclusion of the principle in a Bill before
parliament is contained in the Massachusetts PrecautionaryPrinciple Bill which aims
to establish the principle of precautionary action as 'the guideline for developing
environmental policy and quality standards'. The innovative aspect of the Bill is that it
uses mandatory language in relation to the aplication of the principle by employing
the auxiliary 'shall'. (The long title of the Bill is "An Act to Establis the Principle of
Precautionary Action as the Guideline for Developing Environmental Policy and
Quality Standards for the Commonwealth," House No. 1998 (Mass. 1999)).
7 See infra for discussion of Australian environmental policy documents
containing the principle. The principle is also entrenched in environmental policies of
many other countries. Just one example is the Danish Government's 1995 Nature and
Environment Policy Report.
8 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 53
Washington & Lee L.R. 851, 859 (1996).
9 Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in
Contemporary Environmental Policy and Politics, in Protecting Public Health and
the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 5 (C. Raffensperger & J.
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doubt that some encapsulations of the principle are attractive populist
statements (who can deny the statement "It's better to err on the side
of caution"), overuse of such statements contribute to the perception
that the principle is simply a pleasant-sounding but vacuous concept.
The debate tends to overlook the growing recognition that the principle
has far more substance to it than is indicated, for example, in the oftquoted misstatement that it simply prohibits development projects
wherever there is uncertainty. The principle does not equate a "no risk"
policy but rather requires greater weight to be given to environmental
and public health protection in the all too common situation where
there is insufficient scientific information available upon which to base
decisions. Its most specific instruction is for us to be responsive to
problems created by scientific uncertainty. The two central elements of
the principle are that we should be confident about predictions of
future environmental effects of activities before allowing them and that
we should not wait for conclusive proof of environmental harm before
adopting appropriate remedial measures.
Yet, the principle still faces considerable hurdles. Implementation
remains problematic due to imprecise expressions of it in policy and
law, the fundamental challenge it presents for environmental
management, and the difficulty of making decisions in the face of
scientific uncertainty. Also, as the need for precaution arises in
circumstances where not all the facts are available, the principle's
application will always take place to some degree in a political context.
Fortunately, attention is being devoted to developing the necessary
conceptual frameworks for advancing the concept as well as identifying
the practical steps that can be taken to implement precaution. More
theses, reports and articles are appearing that identify how precaution
10
could be implemented and decision-points for doing so.
Tickner eds., 1999).
10 See, e.g., Joanna Catherine Spencer Brown, Interpreting and Implementing the
Precautionary Principle: The Management of Sulphide Bearing Materials in Nova
Scotia (1997) (unpublished Master of Environmental Studies thesis, Dalhousie
University (Halifax, Nova Scotia)); see also Adrian Deville & Ronnie Harding,
Applying the Precautionary Principle (1998); Protecting Public Health and the
Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Carolyn Raffensperger &
Joel Tickner eds., 1999); see also Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Ronnie
Harding & Elizabeth Fisher eds., 1999).
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This article contributes to this process of facilitating the inclusion of
the principle in decision-making with respect to the approvals process
for large developments. It is submitted that environmental impact
assessment (EIA) is a logical vehicle by which to give effect to the
principle because it is a long-standing practice common in many
jurisdictions and the context in which it is used is appropriate for
considering precaution; namely, whether to proceed with development
proposals in situations where uncertainty exists about future
environmental effects. First, adaptive management is briefly discussed
as a suitable heuristic framework for achieving sustainability objectives.
The precautionary EIA process proposed here should be seen as part of
this approach to effect adaptive responses to environmental exigencies.
A review is then presented of Australia's experience with the principle in
policy, legislation and case law to place this reform proposal in context
of the principle's institutional setting. The common adoption of the
principle in the environmental field is observed together with the need
for more guidance for decision-makers to enable them to implement
precaution. In response to this need for more formal instructions on
how to implement precaution in decision-making processes, a three-step
method is then suggested by which the principle could be integrated
systematically in EIA. 11
Adaptive Institutions: A Note on Uncertainty, Risk and Precaution
In recognition of irreducible uncertainty and complexity in
ecosystems, ecologists have proposed that management interventions be
framed as testable hypotheses with feedback mechanisms established so
that management experience could inform system understanding and,
thus, improvements in management. This notion of adaptive
management envisages situations of multiple uses and stakeholders that
incorporate learning dimensions whereby policy processes and
institutions could adapt in a persistent yet flexible and informed
manner. 12 Many challenges to existing decision-making frameworks
11 Some of the material contained here is drawn from Gullett, supra note 5, and
Warwick Gullett, Environmental Impact Assessment and the PrecautionaryPrinciple:
Legislating Caution in Environmental Protection, 5 Australian J. of Envtl.
Management 146 (1998).
12 See Stephen Dovers & Catherine Mobbs, An Alluring Prospect? Ecology, and
the Requirements of Adaptive Management, in Frontiers in Ecology 39 (N. Klomp &
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are presented by this concept, for example, in determining how to
enable responsive approaches to the problems created by scientific
uncertainty. EIA is a useful analytical tool to utilize because of the
opportunity it provides for public participation as an integral part of an
informed decision-making process which is ongoing and responsive.
This paper focuses on reforming an established, discrete decisionmaking structure to embody the precautionary principle, yet
application of the principle is set to take place within the context of
broader policy and institutional settings. Approaches to uncertainty
developed as part of such institutional evolution will need to have
regard to adaptive processes, thus providing new settings for the
application and interpretation of the precautionary principle. 13 One
area of relevance here is risk management and the established process of
risk assessment. Management decisions based on risk assessment can be
considered to be preventative insofar as issues and projects are
examined prior to their implementation. However, it is important to
recognize that uncertainty analysis - which the precautionary principle
requires - goes beyond risk assessment which focuses on identifiable
hazards and, for many problems, is quite reductionist. An unavoidable
but sometimes overlooked shortcoming of risk assessment is that rarely,
if ever, is full scientific certainty achieved in relation to predictions of
environmental outcomes. This is due to the combination of the
difficulties associated with analyzing complex natural systems and the
nature of scientific inquiry itself. Ambiguity, subjectivity and
assumptions are inherent in scientific methods and interpretations.
Uncertainty is not defined simply by the absence of "objective"
scientific knowledge. It is partly a social construct insofar as it involves
approaches to information affected by, among other things, taboo,
distortion, irrelevance and confusion. 14 Uncertainty is more
I. Lunt eds., 1997).
13 See Elizabeth Fisher & Ronnie Harding, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Towards
a Deliberative, Transdisciplinary Problem-Solving Process, in Perspectives on the
Precautionary Principle 290 (R. Harding & E. Fisher eds., 1999).
14 See Michael Smithson, Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging Paradigms
(1989); Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving
Science in the Preventative Paradigm, 2 Global Envd. Change 111 (1992); Stephen
Dovers & John Handmer, Ignorance, the PrecautionaryPrinciple, and Sustainability,
24 Ambio 92 (1995); and Stephen Dovers & Warwick Gulfett, Policy Choice for
Sustainability: Marketization, Law and Institutions, in Environmental Justice and
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 93 [Spring 2000]

commonly encountered than risk, but often the situation is better
described as one of ignorance, even where there is some uncertainty
about the direction of change (for example, regional impacts of climate
change). 15 In sum, uncertainty can exist where the likely direction of
change is known, but probability distributions cannot be assigned to
outcomes, as can be done with risk.
Certainly risk assessment is necessary for the precautionary principle
due to the need to identify and analyze the risks, costs and benefits
associated with issues and projects. Yet a broader approach is necessary,
one that would, for example, take into account cumulative effects and
strategic planning. Specifically, a more explicit attempt to include
uncertainty analysis is needed to make the existing, rather narrowfocused risk assessment process truly precautionary. The need to
consider uncertainty is not satisfied by the current practice of building
pessimistic assumptions into risk assessments because the focus remains
on risks, which are, by definition, outcomes that are identifiable and
quantifiable, rather than largely unknown. Risk assessments are
preventative, and the distinction between "prevention" and "precaution"
is important. Prevention deals with avoiding an identifiable threat,
whereas precaution is aimed at avoiding uncertain outcomes which
may, or may not, be harmful (although there must be some reason to
believe that harm may occur). The precautionary principle is innovative
because it encompasses the preventative aspects of traditional regulatory
approaches, but also justifies acting in advance of knowledge where
outcomes are uncertain; that is, before a perceived threat becomes a
known risk.
Another limitation of risk assessments as currently practiced is that
they tend to simplify available information due to the constraints of
decision-making, thus obscuring the limitations of the available
information. A message that needs to be underscored is that the
numerical estimates provided in risk assessments of probability and
severity of harm can create "a false security that the numbers derived
are legitimate and correct" 16 when, in fact, there are significant parts
Market Mechanisms: Key Challenges for Environmental Law and Policy 110 (K.
Bosselmann & B.J. Richardson eds., 1999).
15 See Smithson, id.
16 Allison R. Denning, Formulating a Publicly Acceptable Risk-Based Management

Gullett: Precautionary Principle 99

of the process which are non-scientific and subjective. The
precautionary principle is relevant here because it encourages more
critical examination of scientific information by reminding us of the
subjective and imprecise nature of many scientific endeavors.
Recognition of the broader nature of uncertainty presents the
challenge of devising methods to deal with its wide-ranging
ramifications. What is dealt with here is a proposal to give effect to the
principle by reforming an existing environmental management tool:
EIA. The institutional setting of the precautionary principle in Australia
is used to frame this approach. Although the measures suggested here
do not purport to solve the complex problems created by uncertainty
and meeting the challenges presented by adaptive management, it is
submitted that they are a necessary practical step towards more
precautionary and adaptive environmental decision-making.
Adoption of the Precautionary Principle in Australia
There has been considerable interest in Australia's experience with
the precautionary principle due to the early and systematic inclusion of
it in environmental policy documents and legislation and the status
accorded to it by the courts. This section reviews this experience and
shows that the adoption of the principle in Australia is better
characterized as widespread, rather than innovative.
Inclusion in Policy Documents
The precautionary principle was firmly established in Australia with
the signing, in May 1992, of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the
Environment (IGAE) 17 by the Commonwealth, States and Territories
and the Australian Local Government Association. 18 Although as a
Approach to Decision-Making for the Nova Scotia Department of the Environment

26 (unpublished Master of Environmental Studies thesis, Dalhousie University

(Halifax, Nova Scotia)).
17 The IGAE set up a framework for improved environmental management

throughout Australia. It aims to provide a mechanism to facilitate a co-operative
national approach to the environment, better definition of the roles of the respective

governments, greater certainty in decision-making and better environmental
protection.

18 Australia has a federal system of government which consists of the Federal (or

Commonwealth) government and the governments of the six states and two
territories. There also exists another level of government: local government. Many

environmental responsibilites which had been the purview of state governments in the

period following federation now rest with local government. In effect, there are three
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political accord the IGAE is not legally binding on the parties, it is
influential because it is the highest level of environmental policy
commitment that exists between all three spheres of government
(federal, state and local). The precautionary principle is listed as one of
four principles intended to inform environmental policy and programs
within the purview of each of the parties, thus covering all Australian
public environmental policy and management decisions. Under clause
3.5.1, the parties agreed that, "Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation." This is the traditional formulation of the
principle - closely resembling that contained in the 1992 Rio
Declaration - which embodies the notion that cautious actions should
be taken whenever uncertain environmental risks are encountered.
However, the IGAE expands upon this core requirement. "In the
application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions
19
should be guided by:
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or
irreversible damage to the environment; and
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various
options."
Schedules to the Agreement identify specific areas of policy and
management where the principle "should" be applied. These are:
* data collection and handling;
" resource assessment, land use and approval processes;
" environmental impact assessment;
"national environment protection measures;
" climate change;
" biological diversity;
* national estate;
"World Heritage; and
* nature conservation.
levels of government with environmental responsibilities. See Timothy Doyle &
Aynsley Kellow, Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia 145 (1995).
19 Commonwealth of Australia, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment

(May 1992).
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Part (ii) above is an important expansion to the Rio Declaration
formulation because it gives more substance to the principle by
indicating that precaution requires careful assessment of various
management options and that they be balanced in any final decision.
However, it does not greatly assist implementation of the principle or
remove confusion about its content because further necessary detail is
lacking about exactly how, for example, decision-makers should assess
"risk-weighted consequences." Another concern with this formulation
of the principle is that it is phrased in preventive rather than
precautionary language. It does this by focusing on risk (including
"serious" and "irreversible" damage) rather than uncertainty, which, as
explained above, is the essence of the principle.
Another important document which includes the principle is the
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, 2 0 also
released in 1992, which outlines essential approaches for achieving
ecologically sustainable development (ESD) (Australia's version of
"sustainable development"). Some of these approaches are consistent
with precaution, such as considering national implications of local
activities and taking long-term rather than short-term views in
environmental decision-making. The Strategy, although not employing
the term "precautionary principle," does adopt the principle by
mirroring the first part of the IGAE definition.
The recognition of pervasive and irreducible risk and uncertainty
associated with sustainability issues is leading to a crucial rethinking of
approaches to environmental management. At a practical level, the
Australian Standard/New Zealand Standard 4360 Risk Management
has been developed for generic use in risk assessment and management.
Given the IGAE definition of the precautionary principle to include
"risk-weighted assessments," the Risk Management Standard may well
become a major mechanism for interpreting whether the principle has
been adequately applied in decision processes, as it is the only
formalized framework available. Proposals to insert widely applicable
"duty of care" provisions in resource and environmental laws in
Australia state that principles of risk identification, prediction and
management would be central to such legal reform. 2 1 The principle's
20 Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable
Development (1992).
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 93 [Spring 2000]

prevalence in Australia is evidenced by its inclusion in numerous specific
Commonwealth and State environmental policy documents, 22 as well
as overarching policy documents such as the IGAE and the National
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSESD). It is now
rare for an environmental policy document not to mention the principle
or to adopt it implicitly by referring to ESD.
Inclusion in Legislation
In the later part of the 1990s, the precautionary principle appeared
in Australian statutes with increasing frequency. Due to its now
entrenched status in Australian environmental policy, it is normally
mentioned in some form in new statutes dealing with environmental
protection. Further, a number of provisions in environmental legislation
enacted prior to the principle's widespread adoption in policy
instruments in the early 1990s have been updated to include the
principle. For example, an important reference to it in Commonwealth
legislation is contained in the Environment, Sports and Territories
Legislation Amendment Act, 1995, § 31 (Cth), which amended the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act, 1975, § 39z (Cth) to require the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority to be informed by the
principle in preparing management plans and protecting World
Heritage values. The Act adopts the IGAE definition of the principle.
In addition, the Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act, 1997, Sched. 2
(Cth) amended the Fisheries Management Act, 1991, § 3(1)(b) (Cth)
to provide that the Minister, in the administration of the Act (and the
Australian Fisheries Management Authority in the performance of its
23
functions), "must" pursue the objective of.
ensuring that the exploitation of fisheries resources and the
carrying on of any related activities are conducted in a
21 See Industry Commission, A Full Repairing Lease: Inquiry into Sustainable Land
Management, Report no. 60 (1998). (I thank Stephen Dovers for suggesting this to
me.)

22 These include the Guiding Principles for the Sustainable Management of Coastal
Resources, the National Strategy for Rangeland Management, the National Strategy
for the Conservation of Australia's Biological Diversity, the National Waste
Minimisation and Recycling Strategy, the National Greenhouse Response Strategy,
and the Tasmanian State Policy on Water Policy Management.
23 The principle is also contained in the Ozone Protection Act, 1989 (Cth) by way
of the inclusion in Schedule 3 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer.
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manner consistent with the principles of ecologically
sustainable development and the exercise of the
precautionary principle, in particular the need to have
regard to the impact of fishing activities on non-target
species and the long term sustainability of the marine
environment.
The most recent Commonwealth inclusion of the principle is
contained in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act, 1999 (EPBC Act). Section 391 is the most progressive legislative
inclusion of the principle in Australia. The section provides that the
Minister "must take account of the precautionary principle" in making
any of the 16 specific decisions listed in Section 391(3).24 These
decisions include whether to approve projects or developments and
decisions relating to conservation and management plans. The
innovative nature of the provision is that it requires consideration of the
principle in situations deemed appropriate. Therefore, the principle is
now a matter that must be taken into account for these decisions, rather
than a matter that may be taken into account. The provision will do
much to entrench precautionary thinking at the highest level of
environmental decision-making and will provide a firmer basis for
litigants to argue that application of precaution is necessary in certain
cases. The formulation of the principle adopted is a reworded, but
substantively identical, version of that contained in the IGAE.
Regrettably, the opportunity was not taken to provide a stronger and
more precise definition of the principle. This is unfortunate, considering
that the Act is the main product of a large-scale review of
Commonwealth environmental law and will be the pivotal piece of
Commonwealth environmental legislation. Among other things, it
provides the new legislative basis for federal EIA. Section 391(2) which
states, "The precautionary principle is that lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to
24 A curious proviso is contained in § 391(1): the Minister need only consider the
principle "to the extent he or she can do so consistently with the other provisions of
this Act." It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the mere "consideration" of the
principle could be inconsistent with other provisions in the Bill. Perhaps this proviso
indicates legislative contemplation that the principle would largely be applied to some
degree. Consider also that Part 16, in which the section is located, is titled
"Application of precautionary principle in decision-making."
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 93 [Spring 2000]

prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats of
serious or irreversible environmental damage."
Although the principle is espoused in a handful of Commonwealth
Acts, there has been greater explicit endorsement of precaution in State
legislation. This is because authority to legislate on environmental
matters is traditionally the preserve of the State parliaments because
they have authority to legislate on matters not specifically reserved to
the Commonwealth parliament by the Australian Constitution. The
conventional view is that the Commonwealth has no environmental
power (or at least no exclusive environmental jurisdiction) due to the
absence of a head of power specifically dealing with environmental
matters in §§51 or 52 of the Constitution. 2 5 The first legislative
inclusion of the principle in Australia is found in the New South Wales
(NSW) Protection of the Environment Administration Act, 1991.
Section 6(2) outlines the principles of ESD and specifies that it can be
achieved, in part, by implementing "the precautionary principle,
namely, that if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation." This
section is referred to in many subsequent NSW statutes where the
Parliament considered that principles of ESD should be complied with
in other fields. 2 6 An early inclusion of the principle is found in the
Environment Protection Act, 1993 (SA). The objectives of the Act
include ensuring that "all reasonable and practicable measures are taken
to protect, restore and enhance the quality of the environment having
25 In the period 1976 to 1989, a number of legal challenges regarding the
constitutional validity of Commonwealth environmental legislation were prosecuted.
The High Court of Australia delivered four pivotal decisions incorporating expansive
interpretations of a number of relevant heads of Commonwealth power and upheld
the validity of each enactment challenged (see e.g., Murphyores Inc. Pty. Ltd. v.
Commonwealth (1976) 136 C.L.R. 1). It confirmed t at the main source of
Commonwealth environmental power relates to the implementation of obligations in
treaties, or (in the absence of a treaty) in the more problematic concept of legitimate
"international concern" (see Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168,
220).
26 See, e.g., Coastal Protection Act, 1979, § 54A; Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act, 1979, § 112D(g); Energy Services Corporations Act, 1995, §§
5(1)(b), 8(1)(b); Fire Brigades Act, 1989, § 10A; Gas Supply Act, 1996, § 3(1)(a);
National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1974, § 91CC(2)(a; Threatened Species
Conservation Act, 1995, § 4(1)(b); and Waste Minimisation and Management Act,
1995, § 3(2)(h).
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regard to the principles of ESD" and "to apply a precautionary
27
approach to the assessment of risk of environmental harm."
Despite the appearance of the principle in Australian legislation with
environmental matters, specific references to the principle, separate
from its inclusion as a major component of ESD, are rare. The principle
is contained in statutes as a specifically mentioned component of ESD
or by way of inclusion of the IGAE in schedule sections of legislation.
Australian examples include:
* Environment Protection Act, 1997, § 3(2)(a) (ACT);
* Gungahlin Development Authority Act, 1996, §7(3)(a) (ACT);
" National Environment Protection Council Act, 1994, Sched. 1
(Cth);
" Contaminated Land Management Act, 1997, §10(2)(a) (NSW);
" Local Government Amendment (Ecologically Sustainable
Development) Act, 1997, Sched. 1 (NSW);
- Native Vegetation Conservation Act, 1997, §4(2)(a) (NSW).
Some Acts do not specifically refer to the principle but enable
consideration to be given the essence of the principle by, e.g.,
prohibiting the postponement of measures to prevent environmental
degradation simply due to an absence of scientific certainty with
respect to threats of causing serious or irreversible damage. 28 There is a
compelling argument that legislative intent requires decision-makers to
consider the principle, even where it is not specifically referred to in
legislation. As precaution is accepted as a guiding principle of ESD, it
must be recognized as implicit in any statement of ESD. 29 References
30
to ESD in legislation would entail a consideration of the principle.
27 Section 10(1)(b)(iv).
28 See, e.g., Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act, 1997, § 21(3)(b)(ii) (Cth).
The existence of the principle in Australian legislation is extensive when one considers
the 75 Commonwealth, state and territory statutes that include the ecologically
sustainable development (ESD) concept (which includes the principle) and the 30
proceedings in courts and tribunals that have dealt with these principles. See Greg
Rose, Implementation of the Rio Principles in Australia, Papers from the Workshop
on National Implementation of the Principles Contained in The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Jan. 1214, 1999.
29 See Ronnie Harding & Liz Fisher, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in Australia, in
Interpreting the Precautionary Principle 252, 257 (T. O'Riordan & J. Cameron eds.,
1994).
30 Acts which fall into this category include the Endangered Species Protection
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 93 [Spring 2000]

A recent inclusion of a version of the principle is contained in the
NSW State Environmental Planning Policy No. 58 - Protecting
Sydney's Water Supply issued under the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act, 1979 (NSW). 3 1 The Policy, which commenced
effect on February 1, 1999, provides that for any development that has
significant potential to impact on drinking water quality in Sydney's
catchment, the developer will need to provide evidence that the
development will have either a neutral or beneficial impact on water
quality and that the methods of containing and treating any pollutants
generated are sustainable in the long term. Neither the precautionary
principle nor scientific uncertainty are mentioned in the Policy.
However, the Policy embodies a strong version of precaution in the
sense that it places an obligation on the developer to establish that the
32
proposed development will not adversely impact on water quality.
Approval can be refused on the grounds that a developer has not
furnished the consent authority with an assessment of these matters.
Although the inclusion of the precautionary principle in Australian
legislation is widespread (particularly in relation to other developed
countries), the formulations of it in statutes are not strong. The new
EPBC Act, 1999, is a notable exception insofar as it provides for
mandatory consideration of the principle, although it provides a
relatively weak version of precaution. Most existing acts adopt the
IGAE definition, which is itself only a slightly expanded form of the
rather weak Rio Declaration version. As such, current legislative
incorporations of the principle in Australia are worded generally and
reflect an intent to advance precautionary decision-making but not to
mandate particular environmental outcomes based on precautionary
criteria. Legislators have not turned their attention to clearly expressing
the principle so that it will be implemented in discrete cases.
Act, 1992, § 32(3)(c), 34(3)(c), 60, 70, 81 (Cth); Natural Resources Management
(Financial Assistance) Act, 1992, § 3(2)(b) (Cth); and the Agricultural and
Veterinary Chemicals (Northern Territory) Act, 1995, preamble (NT).
31 New South Wales Government Gazette no. 178 at 10163 (December 24, 1998).
See also Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning, Minister for Housing (NSW),
Tough New Policy to Safeguard Sydneys Drinking Water, News Release, Dec. 24,
1998.
32 Also, Clause 12 of the Policy contains a notification requirement where a
proposed development has less than a "significant" potential to impact on water
quality.
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To date, in Australia, the principle's most important test implementation - has been bedevilled by problems. This is due, in
large part, to concerns by industry groups that there should be certainty
concerning the principle's implementation. Governments, being
concerned about reducing investment opportunities, have been cautious
about adopting strict versions of precaution and, thus, we see the
prevalence of "let-out" phrases in virtually all legislative examples of the
principle (including the words "wherever practicable" in the IGAE
formulation supra). The principle typically is either contained in nonoperative provisions of legislation or it is relaxed and expressed in
permissive terms. As such, existing Australian legislative and policy
enunciations of the principle are of limited practical use due to their
ambiguity; decision-makers are not bound to apply the principle, and
are in doubt as to how to do so. Although the federal government has
embraced the principle internationally and domestically, the current
practice of repeatedly espousing the principle as a guide to
environmental decision-making is not sufficient to discharge the
Commonwealth's obligation to ensure that the precautionary approach
33
is "widely applied."
JudicialApplication
The true test of effectiveness of the principle is not simply the
inclusion of it in legislation, but rather the willingness of the courts to
uphold its application as expressed in statutes. 34 However, due to the
weak incorporation of it in Australian legislation, there is little
Australian jurisprudence on the principle. It has been judicially
considered in a handful of cases, most notably in a series of decisions of
the NSW Land and Environment Court, and more recently, by the
35
Federal Court of Australia in the Friends of Hinchinbrook case.
The first and most significant judicial consideration of the principle
was in 1993 by Judge Stein in the NSW Land and Environment Court
in Leatch v. National Parks and Wildlife Service. 3 6 His Honour
33 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 3.
34 See Harding & Fisher, supra note 29, at 255.
35 Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v. Minister for Environment (1997) 69
F.C.R. 28. See Rosemary Lyster, The Relevance of the Precautionary Principle:
Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v. Minister for Environment, 14 Envtl. &
Planning L. J. 390 (1997) and Gullett, supra note 11, at 155.
36 81 L.G.E.R.A. 270 (1993). The decision in Leatch has been referred to in most
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noted the inclusion of the principle in government strategies and
legislation, and while stating that there was no express legislative
provision requiring the consideration of the principle in the matter
before him, refused a license for a road through an area of endangered
species habitat because of uncertainty as to impacts on the species and
lack of consideration of alternatives. He stated that "the precautionary
principle is a statement of commonsense . . . where uncertainty or
ignorance exists ... decision makers should be cautious." 3 7 This is an

example of how the principle can operate as a determining factor in
environmental decisions.
However, optimism that the NSW Land and Environment Court
was going to establish a firm basis for the application of the principle
was shaken by obiter dicta in a decision less than one year later. In
Nicholls v. Director General of National Parks and Wildlife
Service, 3 8 a case concerning the same legislative provision that was
considered in Leatch, 39 a sharply contrasting judgment was delivered.
At issue was the applicant's contention that the precautionary principle
should be invoked to refuse the granting of a license for forestry
operations to "take or kill" endangered fauna because there were
shortcomings in the fauna impact statement (required to accompany
any application for such a license) which prevented the determination of
appropriate ameliorative measures as required by the Act. Judge Talbot
stated that the applicant's contention went beyond that argued and
endorsed in Leatch and upheld the issuance of the license. He
40
continued:
[T]he statement of the precautionary principle, while it may
be framed appropriately for the purpose of a political
subsequent Australian judicial decisions which discuss the principle. It was considered
by the High Court in R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte
Duddridge (decision delivered 4 October 1994), although held to be of no relevance
to English law. See David Hughes, The Status of the 'PrecautionaryPrinciple' in
Law: R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Duddridge, 7 J. of
Envtl. Law 224 (1995).
37 Id. at 282-84. See also Gullett, supra note 5, at 62-64.
38 84 L.G.E.RA. 397 (1994).
39 The definition of "take or kill" in National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1974, § 5
(NSW) (since repealed).
40 Nicholls, 84 L.G.E.R.A. at 419.
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aspiration, its implication as a legal standard could have the
potential to create interminable forensic argument. Taken
literally in practice it might prove to be unworkable. Even
the applicant concedes that scientific certainty is essentially
impossible. It is only 500 years ago that most scientists were
convinced the world was flat.
Such differing interpretations are perhaps predictable in these early days
of the principle's incorporation in domestic law, but they reinforce the
inoperational nature of the principle as currendy expressed in legislation
and policy documents.
Despite the absence of legislative expression of an enforceable
standard of precaution, since 1997, the principle has been argued in
court cases more frequently, mostly by applicants or respondents
seeking to have planning decisions influenced by precaution. For
example, in Grishin v. Conservator of Flora and Fauna,4 1 the applicant
sought a review of the decision not to allow her to ride a horse in a
designated nature reserve. The respondent, in seeking to have the
decision upheld, argued that the precautionary principle should apply
to the decision. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Administrative
42
Appeals Tribunal stated:
We... believe that the adoption of a cautious approach to
the protection of the environment is consistent with the
object and purpose of the Nature Conservation Act [ACT
1980] and the management objectives applying to Aranda
Bushland. However it is a matter of judgement as to
whether the granting of permission to take horses into
Aranda Bushland at the present time would be incautious.
The tribunal considered evidence given by an expert witness that
baseline data should be obtained so that there could be scientific
measurement and evaluation of any future environmental impact by
horses on the land. In summarizing the evidence, the tribunal stated
that it appeared that "well-controlled and cared for horses pose only a
43
small risk."
41

[1998] A.C.T.A.A.T. 250 (23 April 1998).

42 Id.para 15.
43 Id. para 21.
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44
The tribunal stated further that it was not persuaded:

that horses admitted under the controls envisaged.., would
contribute significantly to soil erosion. However the
possibility that they may carry weed seeds into the Aranda
Bushland and that the seed growth may be promoted by
horse manure cannot be ruled out, particularly if horses
step off the formed gravel tracks.
In deciding to uphold the decision, the tribunal regarded the
"desirability" of first obtaining baseline scientific data so that there
could be assessment of any future impact of horses on the Aranda
Bushland. Quite remarkably, the tribunal based its decision, in part, on
precaution. It did so even though it was not certain that the activity in
question would cause significant harm. It was sufficient to base the
decision on the mere possibility of harm being caused, given that this
approach was consistent with the intent expressed in the relevant statute
under which the decision was based. 4 5 This recent administrative
appeals case demonstrates that tribunals conducting merits review (but
not necessarily courts conducting judicial review) of environmental
decisions are prepared to consider arguments based on the
46
precautionary principle.
Yet, even when courts find that the principle is a relevant (or rather,
not an irrelevant) consideration, they seem not to be rigorous when
considering whether decision-makers have acted with requisite caution
in the absence of clear instructions to do so in legislation. 4 7 This
44 Id.
45 What is also of note is that the Nature Conservation Act, 1980 (ACT) does not
mention the precautionary principle or even ESD.
46 See R. v. Resource Planning and Development Commission; ex parte Aquatas
Pty. Ltd. (1998) T.A.S.S.C. 82 where, in reviewing a decision made by the Resource
Planning and Development Commission, Cox, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Tasmania stated that the Tasmanian State Coastal Policy, which includes the IGAE
formulation of the principle, requires that, '[i]n the application of the princi le,
decisions must be guided by a proper process of evaluation to avoid damage andof
assessment of the consequences of possible choices." However, on the facts his Honour
held that the Commission's decision in the case did not conflict with the principle.
Thus, the opportunity to quash the decision on precautionary grounds did not present
itself. See a/so the decision of Judge Wright of the same court in R. v. Land Use
Planning Review Panel; ex parte M. F. Cas. Pty. Ltd. (1998) TA.S.S.C. 131.
47 See, e.g., the decision of Judge Gallen in Greenpeace New Zealand Inc. v.
Minister of Fisheries, Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, CP 492/93, Nov. 27,
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indicates a still pressing need for clearer expressions of the principle and
more debate by practitioners and theorists about what the principle
should require in specific circumstances. Nonetheless, in Australia the
principle has been afforded a degree of legal recognition by the courts
and the legislature, as well as being endorsed routinely by all spheres of
government in environmental policy commitments and by the majority
of the professional literature. The increasingly high profile of the
principle in these fora indicate that the necessary ingredients exist for it
to evolve into a common law doctrine. 4 8 It is now unlikely that, in the
environmental arena, it could be held to be an irrelevant consideration.
Indeed, Leatch established that the principle may need to be
considered even if it is not included in the specific legislation upon
which a matter is being litigated. 4 9 Reinforcing this view are the
statements of the High Court of Australia that there is a "legitimate
expectation" that Commonwealth discretion will be exercised in
conformity with the terms of international conventions to which
Australia is a party,50 and there are numerous such conventions which
embody the principle. Yet, more guidance is needed as to the
51
circumstances in which the principle is, or should be, a consideration.
Given the vague language used in legislation enshrining the principle,
the courts have been given an insubstantial mandate to enforce it. The
formulation of the principle in the pieces of legislation which adopt it
indicate that it is most likely to be applied as a general principle of
statutory interpretation and not as a legally enforceable rule. 52 Thus,
the need for more specific operating instructions for applying
precaution in environmental decision-making is clear.
1995. The case is discussed in Sharon Mascher, Taking a 'PrecautionaryApproach'
FisheriesManagement in New Zealand, 14 Envtl. & Planning L. J. 70 (1997) and
Gullett, supra note 5, at 63.
48 See also Charmain Barton, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in
Australia: Its Emergence in Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine, 22 Harvard
Envtl. L. R 509, 535 (1998).
49 See Stephen R. Dovers, Tony W. Norton, and John W. Handmer,
Uncertainty, Ecology, Sustainability and Policy, 5 Biodiversity & Conservation 1143,
1149 (1996).
50 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 at
287-88 per Chief Justice Mason and Judge Deane; at 298-303 per Toohey, J.; at 303305 per Judge Gaudron.
51 The inclusion of the principle in the EPBCAct, 1999, is welcome in this regard.
52 See Gerry Bates, Editorial,11 Envtl. & Planning L. J. 251,253 (1994).
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Other Examples ofPrecaution in Australia
The Australian experience with the precautionary principle has been
characterized by considerable conflict, particularly concerning
environmental lobbyists and industries associated with resource
extraction. This is because Australia has a resource-based economy, and
application of the principle is seen by many to be a threat to resource
security. 53 Industry groups continue to pressure governments to
54
consider economic implications of environmental objectives.
Concerns expressed by these industries tend to mirror concerns
expressed in other countries - that the principle requires the
prohibition of activities where there is uncertainty. Thus, if precaution
were to be adopted as a governing principle, development would be
55
characterised by a "do nothing" approach.
However, this view is inconsistent with all formulations of the
principle. The principle requires some indication that harm may result
before the burden shifts to the proponent of an activity to negate the
possibility of unacceptable harm. 5 6 There is, or should be, a quasiscientific threshold (differing according to the level of anticipated
harm) which must be met in order for it to be necessary to consider the
principle. However, even where there are grounds to implement
precautionary measures, these still should be weighed against expected
benefits, including economic, which may be foregone if a proposed
activity is prohibited. Importantly, some benefits of implementing
precaution are non-quantifiable (e.g., improvement in air quality), and
53

See Harding & Fisher, supra note 29, at 253. Consider also the federal

government's successful bid to have less onerous conditions placed on it at the
greenhouse reduction meeting in Kyoto. See Clive Hamilton, Australia's Climate
Change Victory: A Poisoned Chalice, 3 Ecological Econ. Bull. 10 (1998).
54 See Gordon Drake, Precautionary Principle: A Mining Perspective. Paper
presented at the Precautionary Principle Conference, Institute of Environmental
Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Sept. 20-21, 1993. For example,
Drake notes that the Australian Mining Industry Council's position is that risk-taking
should not be eliminated. It has arguedthat this is essential in human progress.
55 See Ronald Brunton, We Must Adopt a Risk-Averse Approach and Always Err
on the Side of Caution When Dealing with Environmental Issues, in Tall Green Tales
29 (J. Bennett ed., 1995); Hickey & Walker, supra note 5, at 425; and Ian Wills,

The Environment, Information and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 4 Agenda 51 (1997).
56 This is particularly the case in weak formulations of the principle, such as in the
Rio Declaration, where the threshold for application is threats of 'serious or
irreversible damage."
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likewise it can be difficult to measure economic benefits of
developments. Even though complete information is unobtainable, what
information there is can be weighed in order to achieve a wellconsidered decision appropriate for the context. Where the magnitude
of uncertainty is large, more reliance on precaution is warranted. The
fundamental misunderstanding about the principle - that it simply, and
irrationally, stops development - and the rhetoric associated with it,
indicates the need for more discussion and education about what the
57
principle does, and does not, entail.
Application of the principle has been advocated in areas other than
the environmental field (including health concerns such as the
uncertainty associated with cellular telephone towers). Arguably, the
most important non-judicial decision made on precautionary grounds
in Australia is that concerning the NSW government's rejection in 1996
of a proposal to construct an open-cut gold mine in the Lake Cowal
area in the central west region of the state. The area is a listed wetland
under the National Estate 58 and is considered by Commonwealth and
state government agencies to meet criteria for listing under the Ramsar
Convention 59 and there is much uncertainty about the effects a mine
would have on the environment. Notwithstanding this, a Commission
of Inquiry found that likely environmental impacts were consistent with
57 For further explanation of the principle, see Gullett, supra note 5. Events such as
the Precautionary Principle conference held at the Institute of Environmental Studies
at the University of New South Wales in 1993 and the Wingspread conference,
Strategies for Implementing the Precautionary Principle, held in Racine, Wisconsin in
1998 are important in this regard because they bring together a range of people from
many disciplines, all of which are touched by the principle. See also arguments about
the dangers of risk-tradeoffs and false positives ('Type I' error) which have done much
to undermine the precautionary principle by incorrectly asserting that the principle
does not enable consideration of negative consequences of precaution. On this point,
see Cross, supra note 8, and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the Global
Environment, in Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the
Environment 193 (J.D. Graham & J. B. Weiner eds., 1995). Type I and Type II errors
are discussed in R. Michael M'Gonigle et al., Taking Uncertainty Seriously: From
Permissive Regulation to Preventative Design in Environmental Decision Making, 32
Osgoode Hall L. J. 99 (1994).
58 National Estate areas are protected by the Australian Heritage Commission
under the Australian Heritage Commission Act, 1975 (Cth). Section 4 specifies that
for a place to be listed on the National Estate, it must be part of Australia s natural or
cultural environment and have aesthetic, historic, scientific or social significance or
other special value for future generations as well as existing generations.
59 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (1972).
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planning and environmental guidelines, 60 thus presenting the
government with no legal hurdles with respect to the issuance of a
development consent order. The decision of the government to act as it
did in the face of pressure from the proponent, North Limited, as well
as the Australian Workers' Union, is remarkable given that the proposal
had met all necessary requirements and had satisfied a Commission of
Inquiry. The government based its decision, in large part, on the
grounds that only by refusing the proposal could unknown risks to a
significant environment be avoided. 6 1 Undoubtedly, other political
factors influenced the decision to some degree, thus calling into
question the strength of commitment to the principle espoused by the
government. Notwithstanding this, the government's use of the
precautionary language, in a context where the level of uncertainty
made consideration of precaution appropriate, provides evidence that
precautionary thinking has achieved legitimacy as a reasonable basis for
public decision-making.
More indirect versions of precaution are evident in other areas. For
example, there has been considerable development in cleaner
production and environmental management systems in the 1990s.
Many corporations are seeking accreditation for the ISO 14000 series of
standards which cover issues, such as life-cycle assessment and
environmental auditing. 62 Also, the inclusion of the principle in most
state and federal environmental policy documents not only has
influenced decisions by governments and ministerial authorities, but it
also has influenced the recognition of it by professional organisations
and corporations which, although not necessarily commiting themselves
to the application of the principle, do adopt environmental policies
which include ESD. 63 However, more work needs to be done on
determining other ways to implement precaution, such as subsidies or
research grants for clean technology, waste minimization plans, safe
minimum standards, prohibition or limited sale of certain products,
injunctive remedies and adaptive management. 6 4 The task is to
60 See Deville & Harding, supra note 10 at 11.
61 At the time of writing (mid 1999), a new development application for the mine is
being considered. However, a number of aspects of the original proposal have been
modified significantly.
62 See Deville & Harding, supra note 10, at21.
63 Id. at 15-16.
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recognise when and how to use different techniques appropriately to
support decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty. Decisionmakers need clear guidance as to the circumstances in which they need
to adopt precautionary responses and they also need to know which
methods to use. In this respect, after a development approval decision
has been made, there is a need for courts to be empowered to ascertain
what precautionary methods were used, and the reason for selecting
them, as part of the process of assessing whether the principle was taken
65
into account appropriately.
On the whole, Australian environmental strategies tend to be
cautiously preventative, rather than anticipatory and precautionary. The
National Pollutant Inventory (NPI), established in 1996, is an example.
The Commonwealth established the inventory - mainly a reporting
and public disclosure exercise - of substances which are "known to, or
reasonably expected to, cause serious health problems or severe damage
to the environment," that is, only substances with a clearly identified
hazard potential. 6 6 A truly precautionary approach would apply
regulatory standards to substances about which there may still be
uncertainty, a process known as "reverse listing." 67 The focus should
be to establish the principle as a mandatory consideration in
environmental matters. This has, in late 1999, been achieved for certain
decisions made under the EPBC Act, however, in many other contexts
decision-makers can ignore the principle in circumstances in which its
consideration or application is appropriate. A compounding factor is
that existing law in property and torts in this regard is far from
precautionary because it is heavily influenced by the assimilative
capacity approach which holds that the environment can tolerate certain
64 For more detail on the techniques available to support decision-making in the
face of scientific uncertainty, including the 1995 Risk Management Standard
(AS/NZS 4360), see Dovers et al., supra note 49.
65 For a discussion of how courts should substantively review expert decisions made
under scientific uncertainty, see Elizabeth Fisher, Risk, Expertise and Judicial Review:
Scope of Review and Decision Making Under Scientific Uncertainty (1998)
(unpublished D.Phil. in Law thesis, St. John's College, Oxford University).

66 Commonwealth Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Inventory:
What it Means to You (1996).
67 See, e.g., the Canadian Pest Control Products Act, 1985; and Article 4 of the
1996 revisions to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter.
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activities and levels of pollutants without detrimental change to overall
quality. For example, for a concerned resident to succeed in prohibiting
a development application where planning guidelines have been met, he
or she typically is required to adduce evidence to show that the activity
would result in impermissible environmental harm, rather than the
developer being required to establish that the activity is unlikely to
result in such harm. The principle is, at least in its strictest forms, quite
a radical departure from traditional concepts of property law which
have developed out of a perception that the environment is a resource to
exploit rather than to conserve; and as a result, it requires innovative
methods to be implemented. 6 8 The principle is a stated aim of
virtually all environmental policy documents and its expression in
environmental legislation is commonplace, yet attention now needs to
shift to the task of assisting decision-makers to implement precaution.
A Precautionary Option: Environmental Impact Assessment
The need to integrate the precautionary principle systematically in
decision-making requires us to examine the potential to include it in
existing environmental protection measures. EIA is the most
sophisticated environmental protection framework that exists in many
jurisdictions, and therefore, it is arguably the most obvious vehicle for
giving effect to the principle and the logical starting point for reform
options. In 1974, Australia became the second country, after the U. S.,
to introduce legislative EIA measures. EIA has become an established
component in the planning process for most major developments in
Australia, and it is the only federal legislative process which provides
expressly for environmental considerations to be taken into account in
developmental decision-making. The purpose of EIA is that matters
affecting the environment are fully examined and taken into account so
that activities avoid or minimize anticipated adverse environmental
effects. The hallmark of the process is its institutionalisation of
foresight. It introduces consideration of environmental factors as a
condition precedent to planning decisions. 6 9 Not only are the
precautionary principle and EIA complementary in so far as they are
68 See Barton, supra note 48, at 542.
69 For more detail on Australian EIA, see Nick Harvey, Environmental Impact
Assessment: Procedures, Practice, and Prospects in Australia (1998).
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both means of informing decision-making, but EIA itself is also
precautionary in a minimal sense because it is predicated on addressing
uncertainty about future environmental effects, 7 0 although one
concern often expressed is that in practice EIAs tend to be poor in
identifying knowledge gaps and uncertainties. 7 1 Feedback
mechanisms of post-decision monitoring in good EIA processes fulfill
the learning goal of adaptive management. Further, subsequent EIAs of
similar proposals enable the transfer of experience across departments,
developers and practitioners.
Connections between EIA and sustainable development have been
made for more than a decade, including by the World Commission on
72
Environment and Development in the 1987 Brundtland Report.
There is consensus among environmental planners and resource
managers that EIA must reflect sustainable development principles
more closely. However, little has been done in a formal capacity to
effect this goal. The question is: "How can these practical steps be
taken?"
A three-step method is presented for integrating the precautionary
principle, a key component of sustainable development, into legislative
EIA processes. 73 In sum, effective integration of the principle in
current project-specific EIA requires three modifications to existing
processes. 74 They would need to ensure that:
70 See James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle: Core Meaning,
Constitutional Framework and Procedures for Implementation. Paper presented at
the Precautionary Principle Conference, Institute of Environmental Studies, The

University of New South Wales, Sydney, September 20-21, 1993.
71 See, e.g., David P. Lawrence, Quality and Effectiveness of Environmental
Impact Assessments: Lessons and Insights from Ten Assessments in Canada, 12
Project Appraisal 219 (1997).
72 World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common Future
222 (1987). See also Australian & New Zealand Conservation Council, A National
Approach to Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia (1991); Commonwealth
of Australia, supra note 19; Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, Th e
PrecautionaryPrinciple as a Norm of Customary InternationalLaw, 9 J. of Envd. L.
221, 238 (1997); and Brown, supra note 10, at 31.
73 For more detail on this argument see Gullett, supra note 5.
74 The basic steps in the EIA process of project screening, scoping of impacts,
description of pro osal and environment affected, assessment of predicted impacts,
community consutation, and post decision monitoring and auditing are, in general
terms, more or less consistent in all EIA jurisdictions, although the detail within each
step can vary considerably.
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1. EIAs are conducted where there is uncertainty regarding
environmental impacts;
2. there is adequate assessment of environmental
uncertainties; and
3. environmental uncertainties are given appropriate weight
in final decisions.
Step 1: Thresholdfor OperationofELA
The first step to integrate the principle in EIA would be to amend
the project screening criteria or threshold for operation of EIA to ensure
that EIAs are not limited to activities which will affect the
environment "to a significant extent" as is the common practice. 75 The
EIA process must also be triggered where there is uncertainty regarding
the possibility of serious environmental impact. Although the
parameters of environmental uncertainty are elusive, particularly at the
larger scale, guidelines could be prepared to render this threshold
operable. This is where more work on risk assessment and uncertainty
analysis needs to be undertaken. A lower evidentiary standard requiring
EIAs where there is insufficient information available to predict whether
non-negligible environmental harm may occur would reflect the
principle in so far as it would shift attention from the acceptability of
the "significance" of the environmental impacts of a proposal to the
acceptability of the scientific uncertainty which attaches to the
predictions of the impacts.
Step 2: Content ofEL4
For the principle to be taken into account, the uncertainty
associated with a proposal (concerning both what is known and not
known) must explicitly be examined and evaluated in EIA. Yet, an
essential prior ingredient for achieving precautionary ELTAs is to ensure
that feasible alternatives to the proposed activity are assessed and
considered. It is necessary from a precautionary standpoint to consider
alternatives, including the "no proposal" alternative, as a way to reduce
environmental impacts by logical choice of best design options, rather
than merely to assess actual predicted impacts of the sole option being
considered. Most jurisdictions require or allow consideration of
alternatives as part of their EIA process. 7 6 However, in practice,
75 See, e.g., Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act, 1974, § 5 (Cth).
76 See, e.g., NEPA, § 102(2)(c)(ii). For a review of consideration of alternatives in
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particularly where EIA processes are largely discretionary, such as in
Australia, the consideration of alternatives is a poorly performed step of
EIA. Invariably few alternatives are considered, and those that are
considered often are done so inadequately. This is because a developer
will typically focus on its primary proposal, and momentum for the
proposal is generated by the process itself.7 7 Consideration of
alternatives is the heart of a precautionary EIA process and should not
merely be a pro, forma procedural requirement. The focus should be to
consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed action to enable
identification and selection of less potentially harmful activities as a way
of minimizing or reducing harm during the early design stage of the
project. Precautionary decision-making would be facilitated by rigorous
qualitative alternatives analysis. It would encourage evaluation of the
purpose of the proposed activity in the first instance, rather than
assuming that the activity will be approved and focusing on the best
78
way to proceed.
The step focused on in this part is the assessment of uncertainty of
the proposal and of practical alternatives. Determining how to assess
and communicate uncertainty is the current challenge. In 1994, the
Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency (EPA) advised the
Australian Federal government to adopt the process the U.S. National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) utilizes for dealing with
incomplete information and scientific uncertainty. 7 9 These include
disclosure requirements of incomplete information and consideration of
more distant and uncertain effects. 8 0 Added to this should be
a number of national EIA processes, see Christopher Wood, Environmental Impact
Assessment: A Comparative Review (1995).
77 Including, for example, financial commitments to the project already made by
this stage of the process and the often predetermined outcome of large scale projects
which take on a political import. For discussion of the political nature of development
issues in Australia, see e.g., David Mercer, 'A Question of Balance': Natural
Resources Conflict Issues in Australia (2d ed. 1995).
78 See Mary O'Brien, Alternatives Assessment: Part of Operationalizing and
Institutionalizing the PrecautionaryPrinciple,in Protecting Public Health and the
Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 207 (C. Raffensperger & J.
Tickner eds., 1999).
79 Environment Protection Agency, Analysis of Environmental Impact Assessment
Practice and Procedures in other Countries 109 (1994). Among other things, NEPA
requires that project or policy proponents look at "the relationship between local
short-term use of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity" (§102(c)(IV)).
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consideration of cumulative and synergistic effects. An important area
here is for EIAs to analyze the potential for irreversible impacts from a
proposed development. Despite the opportunity presented to the
Federal government in 1998-99 to reform the federal EIA process
according to the EPA's comprehensive review based recommendations,
it failed to do so.81
Another necessary step for EIAs to give effect to the essence of the
principle that there be a shift in the "burden of proof' 8 2 is that
proponents should be required to establish that the uncertainties which
attach to the predicted environmental effects of proposals are within
predetermined precautionary "acceptability" criteria or "margin-ofsafety" standards. This burden would be more onerous to discharge
where there is conflicting scientific evidence and may call for a sliding
scale of required proof according to the predicted likelihood and
severity of harm. It may be necessary, at minimum, to require a
developer or potential polluter to establish that no safer way to conduct
the activity is possible.
Determining suitable ways to justify making decisions where
uncertainty exists - typically anathema to decision-makers who
invariably seek uncontested and "objective" information - is an area
where more attention is needed in order to give the precautionary
principle more cogency in decision-making generally, and in EIA in
particular. Critical issues here are how to determine and express
thresholds for appropriate precautionary responses and how best to
communicate evidence of uncertainty to decision-makers who may not
be well-informed about the nature of risk. For example, reason to
believe that a causal link between an activity or pollutant and a negative
environmental or health consequence can be expressed in different
80 See 40 C.F.R. §§1502.22, 1508.27 and Mary K. Fitzgerald, Small-Handles,
Big Impacts: When Should the National Environmental Policy Act Require an
Environmental Impact Statement?, 23 Boston College Envtl. Affairs L. R. 437, 464
(1996).
81 Under EPBC Act, 1999, § 102(2), the Minister must merely "seek to ensure
that the environmental impact statement will "contain enough information about the
[development] and its relevant impacts to allow the Minister to make an informed
decision whether or not to approve."
82 The principle is generally understood as shifting the burden of proof from
environmentalists (that of proving that a development would cause significant harm)
to developers (to prove that it would not cause such harm).
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ways, depending on the strength of the evidence. 83 This can range
from statements such as "the evidence indicates/is consistent with a
causal relation" through to areas of greater uncertainty about a
connection expressed in statements like "there is no evidence bearing on
a causal relation" or "the evidence does not indicate a causal relation."
However, more appropriate ways to express the same degree of
confidence about causal relations can facilitate the making of decisions
based on them. Rather than stating that the evidence "is consistent
with" a causal relation, this could be expressed as the evidence "favors
acceptance of' a causal relation. Similarly, where the evidence is
"insufficient to indicate" a causal relation, this could be expressed as the
evidence "is inadequate to accept or reject" a causal relation.
One area where risk assessment can improve is to provide for
uncertainty in degrees of confidence to be expressed in statement form.
This is to be preferred to assigning numbers to predictions of harm
where uncertainty exists because numerical values create a false
impression of precision where often none exists. This in turn can
contribute to decisions being made more on political grounds where
numbers, rather than meaning, tend to be focused upon. 84 Statements
about uncertainty have the benefit of compelling consideration being
given to the nature of the evidence relied upon, for example, by
specifically addressing issues such as the adequacy of the data and the
level of scientific consensus about data analysis. As such, it is argued
that the final document produced in the EIA process should express the
degree of confidence of predictions and severity of harm in statement
form so that rigorous uncertainty analysis and consideration is more
amenable to the environmental approvals process. Although it is argued
here that it is necessary for more attention to be devoted to assessing
the uncertainties which attach to project options, it is important to
recognize that uncertainty itself cannot be overcome because of its
85
pervasive and cumulative nature in the environmental arena.
83 These arguments are drawn from David A. Butler, Communicating Uncertainty
in Health Risks to Policy-Makers. Paper presented at the Second Biennial
International Meeting of the Risk Assessment and Policy Association, Alexandria,
Virginia, Mar. 25-26, 1999.
84 For discussion of the discrepancies that exist between experts and the public in
risk perception, see Ann Bostrom, Risk Perceptions: 'Experts' vs. 'Lay People'. 8
Duke Envd. L. & Pol'y F. 101 (1997).
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Therefore, the crucial task that follows that of assessing and conveying
uncertainty in EIA is that of how to ensure that decisions are influenced
by the uncertainty.
Step 3: Substantive Influence on Decision-Making

To achieve the stated aim of implementing precaution, it is
imperative that a procedure is adopted whereby precaution actually
influences or governs decisions. This task strikes at the core of the
precautionary principle. In an era in which decision-making is aimed to
be rational - particularly in the fields of law and public administration
any attempt to base decision-making in part on the absence of
information is bound to cause concern. Yet, this is exactly what the
principle instructs us to do. It is unsatisfactory to have a process
whereby uncertainty is assessed, but not considered adequately in final
determinations.
Australian EIA processes, being far more discretionary than, for
example, the EIA process contained in NEPA requires considerable
attention in this regard. 8 6 A legal rule needs to be formulated
requiring the prohibition of an activity or the implementation of other
appropriate precautionary measures where the threshold for application
of the principle is met, unless there is sufficient evidence that the level
of uncertainty involved (not merely risk) is acceptable. This could take
the form of a legislative presumption that the responsible decisionmaker adopts the appropriate precautionary response, preferably
recommended in the environmental impact statement itself or possibly
87
determined by an expert independent review panel.
85 See R Michael M'Gonigle, The Political Economy of Precaution, in Protecting
Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 123
(C. Raffensperger & J. Tickner eds., 1999).
86 Despite being modelled on NEPA, the Australian federal EIA process (as well as
most state processes) dispensed with mandatory procedural requirements because the
government was anxious to avoid the adoption of provisions which might enable the
courts to be the common forum to resolve development disputes, thus causing delays
and increasing the cost of the process. For statutory reform proposals for NEPA in
relation to guiding political decisions and requiring agencies to justify decisions, see
Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act:

Substantive Law Adaptions from NEPA s Progeny, 16 Harvard Envtl. L.R. 207
(1992) and Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National
EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 22 Harvard Envd. L.R. 203 (1998).
87 This could be achieved in a manner similar to the "bounded" decision-making
established in Canada under the innovative Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
1995, § 37(1)(b). See Gullett, supra note 11 at 154.
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However, to enable a utilitarian approach to the principle, this
presumption would be displaced if compelling reasons are given as to
why, in the instant case, precautionary recommendations should not be
followed. This process would be a combination of indirect and direct
precautionary measures. Steps one and two would assist in creating a
climate fostering precautionary thinking, while step three would be
more direct by presumptively requiring application of precaution in
appropriate circumstances.
Although in some cases this procedure would enable precautionary
recommendations to be avoided because it allows contra arguments to
be raised, the principle has never been considered to have mandatory
application in all situations. A threshold for application does need to be
88
determined below which non-precautionary decisions can be taken.
However, even where the threshold is met, it would be too arbitrary to
allow precaution to be the sole criterion for decision-making. Rather, it
should be a significant criterion with presumptive application in
appropriate circumstances with the level of precaution required being
related to the level of uncertainty involved. The approach outlined here
would ensure that uncertainty is expressly taken into account and that
the necessary balancing act of environmental, economic and social issues
is undertaken not simply by considering available scientific evidence,
but also by being critical of such evidence and taking into account the
absence of scientific data, uncertainty and indeterminancy. This would
create more coherence where decision-making is, and will remain,
subjective, and EIA would become a truly precautionary process.
Conclusion
In Australia, the precautionary principle has been adopted widely in
environmental policy and legislation, and it has been accepted
tentatively by the courts as a factor that should be taken into account in
appropriate circumstances. In this respect, Australia is a leading country
in the adoption of the principle as a main plank of environmental
protection. However, although other countries can draw from the
Australian experience with the principle (particularly in relation to the
88 See James Cameron, Will Wade-Gery and Juli Abouchar, Precautionary
Principle and Future Generations, in Future Generations and International Law 93,
100 (E. Agius & S. Busuttil eds., 1998).
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inclusion of it in legislation), it is submitted that the Australian
approach needs to be more rigorous to ensure that environmental
practice is informed by precaution and to ensure that the precautionary
principle amounts to more than a "guiding" principle.
Australian environmental protection measures do not as yet evince
any remarkable degree of innovation in attempting to move away from
conventional regulatory approaches - targeting actors, establishing
causes of action, and apportioning liability in a procedural manner - to
embracing novel methods of dealing with fundamental causes of
environmental harm (which involve profound uncertainty and complex,
poorly understood structural issues). The principle needs to be
expressed in such a way that it can be applied in specific environmental
management and resource decisions. Formulations such as those
contained in the Rio Declaration and the IGAE, although useful for
advancing precautionary thinking, will not enable us to meet the
principle's most important test - implementation. Formulations which
are imprecise, although popularizing precaution, inhibit the
development of operational strategies. Reform options are available to
implement precaution within existing decision-making structures. An
effective approach would be to enshrine the principle in EIA legislation
a task which is not procedurally difficult. However, while many
precautionary principle advocates lament the fact that implementation
of it is poor, it is imperative to recognize its revolutionary character so
that suitable operational strategies can be devised.

